Most research on …rm …nancing studies the choice between debt and equity. We model an alternative source -non-core asset sales -and allow asset sales to occur for operational as well as …nancing motives. We identify three new factors that drive a …rm's choice between selling assets and equity. First, equity investors own a claim to the cash raised. Since cash is certain, this mitigates the information asymmetry of equity (the "certainty e¤ect"). In contrast to Myers and Majluf (1984) , even if assets exhibit less information asymmetry, the …rm issues equity if the …nancing need is high. This result is robust to using the cash for an uncertain investment. Second, …rms can disguise the sale of a low-quality asset as instead being motivated by operational reasons (dissynergies), and thus receive a high price (the "camou ‡age e¤ect"). Third, selling equity implies a "lemons" discount for not only the equity issued but also the rest of the …rm, since its value is perfectly correlated. In contrast, a "lemons"discount on assets need not lead to a low stock price, as the asset is not a carbon copy of the …rm (the "correlation e¤ect").
issuance and vice-versa, how …nancing and operational motives interact, and how …rm boundaries are a¤ected by …nancial constraints. We build a deliberately parsimonious model to maximize tractability; this allows for the key expressions to be solved in closed form and the economic forces to be transparent. The …rm comprises a core asset and a non-core asset. The …rm must raise …nancing to meet a liquidity need, and can sell either equity or part of the non-core asset. Following MM, we model information asymmetry as the principal driver of this choice. The …rm's type is privately known to its manager and comprises two dimensions. The …rst is quality, which determines the assets'standalone (common) values. The value of the core asset is higher for highquality …rms. The value of the non-core asset depends on how we specify the correlation between the core and non-core assets. With a positive (negative) correlation, the value of the non-core asset is higher (lower) for high-quality …rms. The second dimension is synergy: the additional value that the non-core asset is worth to its current owner.
It may seem that asset sales can already be analyzed by applying the general principles of MM's security issuance model to assets, removing the need for a new theory speci…c to asset sales. Such an extension would suggest that assets are preferred to equity if they exhibit less information asymmetry. While information asymmetry is indeed an important consideration, our model identi…es three new forces that also drive the …nancing choice and may outweigh information asymmetry considerations.
First, an advantage of equity is that new shareholders obtain a stake in the entire …rm. This includes not just the core and non-core assets in place (whose value is unknown), but also the cash raised (whose value is known). This mitigates the information asymmetry of the assets in place: the certainty e¤ect. In contrast, an asset purchaser does not share in the cash raised, and thus bears the full information asymmetry associated with the asset's value. Hence, contrary to MM, even if equity exhibits more information asymmetry than the non-core asset, the manager may sell equity if enough cash is raised that the certainty e¤ect dominates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, equity is not always the riskiest claim: if a large amount of …nancing is raised, equity becomes relatively safe.
Formally, a pooling equilibrium is sustainable where all …rms sell assets (equity) if the …nancing need is su¢ ciently low (high). The choice of …nancing thus depends on the amount required. This dependence contrasts standard …nancing models, where the choice depends only on the inherent characteristics of the claim being issued (such as its information asymmetry (MM) or misvaluation (Baker and Wurgler (2002) ) and not the amount required -unless one assumes exogenous limits such as notions of debt capacity. This result also has implications for the investment literature, in which disinvestment occurs due to …nancial constraints and so a greater …nancing need leads to more assets being sold. We show that a greater …nancial shock may reduce asset sales, as …rms substitute into equity. Thus, such a shock can improve real e¢ ciency, as …rms hold onto synergistic assets and instead sell equity.
The certainty e¤ect applies to any use of cash whose expected value is uncorrelated with …rm quality: retaining it on the balance sheet to replenish capital, repaying debt, paying dividends, or …nancing an uncertain investment whose expected payo¤ is independent of …rm quality. We also analyze the case in which the investment return is correlated with …rm quality, and thus exhibits information asymmetry. It may appear that the certainty e¤ect should weaken, since the funds raised are no longer held as certain cash. This intuition turns out to be incomplete, because there is a second e¤ect. Since investment is positive-NPV, it increases the value of the capital that investors are injecting. If the desirability of investment (for …rms of both quality) is high compared to the additional return generated by the high-quality …rm over the low-quality …rm, the second e¤ect dominates -somewhat surprisingly, the certainty e¤ect can strengthen when cash is used to …nance an uncertain investment. This e¤ect makes equity easier to sustain. In contrast, if the additional return generated by the high-quality …rm is su¢ ciently large, then asset sales become preferable. Due to the role of the investment return, the source of …nancing depends on the use of …nancing. In almost all cases, it remains robust that asset (equity) sales are used for low (high) …nancing needs.
A second driver of the …nancing decision is the level of synergies between the noncore asset and the …rm. This consideration leads to "threshold"semi-separating equilibria, in which a …rm sells assets if synergies are below a cuto¤ and equity otherwise. While models of …rm boundaries also predict that …rms will sell dissynergistic assets, here these operational motives interact with …nancing / market timing reasons. Some high-quality …rms sell assets not because they are low-quality, but because they are dissynergistic, allowing low-quality …rms to pool with them. They can disguise an asset sale driven by overvaluation (the asset is of low quality and has a low common value) as instead being driven by operational reasons (it is dissynergistic and only has a low private value): the camou ‡age e¤ect. Low-quality asset sellers can make greater pro…ts than in the pooling equilibria, where the …nancing choice does not depend on synergies and so no disguise is possible. A market in which …rms are selling assets for operational reasons is "deep"and allows other …rms to exploit their private information by selling overvalued assets. This notion of "market depth" is similar to the Kyle (1985) model of securities trading, where a deep market arises when liquidity traders are selling their securities for reasons other than a low common value. Such depth allows informed traders to pro…t from selling securities that do have a low common value.
The threshold synergy level is di¤erent for high-and low-quality …rms, due to the certainty e¤ect. If the amount of …nancing required increases, this reduces the information asymmetry of equity, making it more (less) attractive to high (low) quality …rms. Thus, higher …nancing needs have real e¤ects. First, they a¤ect …rm boundaries by causing some …rms to switch into or away from asset sales. In standard models without …nancial constraints, …rm boundaries depend only on synergies. 2 Intuitively, adding …nancial constraints might suggest that divisions will be sold even if they are synergistic, due to capital needs. Our model allows …rms to raise capital also through equity, and so greater capital needs may reduce asset sales as …rms substitute into equity. Second, greater …nancing needs reduce the quality of assets traded in equilibrium (and thus their price), and increase the quality and price of equity. Thus, the market reaction to equity (asset) sales should be more (less) positive for a larger sale. The camou ‡age e¤ect continues to hold if …rms have the option not to raise …nanc-ing. If low-quality …rms must raise …nancing (because their internal cash generation is low, as in Miller and Rock (1985) ), but high-quality …rms have a choice, we have a semi-separating equilibrium where high-quality …rms with synergistic assets do nothing, and those with dissynergistic assets sell them. Low-quality …rms prefer to meet their …nancing needs through asset sales. Issuing equity would reveal them as low-quality, since no high-quality …rms do so, but asset sales allow them to disguise their …nancing need as being motivated by operational reasons (dissynergies) rather than desperation (low cash generation). Thus, only low-quality …rms with the most synergistic assets issue equity; all others, including some with strictly positive synergies, sell assets.
A third driver is the correlation e¤ect, which represents an advantage to selling assets. When a …rm issues equity, it su¤ers an Akerlof (1970) "lemons"discount -the market infers that the equity is low-quality from the …rm's decision to issue it. Not only does the market pay a low price for the equity issued, but also it attaches a low valuation to the rest of the …rm, because it is perfectly correlated with the issued equity. When a …rm sells non-core assets, it also receives a low price, but critically this need not imply a low valuation for the …rm as the asset sold may not be a carbon copy. Thus, …rms can sell poorly performing assets without sending a negative signal. Formally, in the negative correlation model, the parameter values that support the equity-pooling equilibrium are a strict subset of those that support the asset-pooling equilibrium.
An implication is that conglomerates issue equity less often than …rms with closely related divisions. In addition, asset sales (equity issuance) should lead to positive market reactions, as found empirically. The analysis also highlights a new bene…t of diversi…cation: a non-core asset is a form of …nancial slack. While the literature on investment reversibility (e.g. Abel and Eberly (1996) ) models reversibility as an inherent feature of the asset's technology, here an investment that is not a carbon copy of the …rm is "reversible"in that it can be sold without negative inferences.
Our paper can be interpreted more broadly as studying at what level to issue claims: the …rm level (equity issuance) or the asset level (asset sales). Many of the e¤ects also apply to other types of claim that the …rm can issue at each level. All three e¤ects apply to parent-company risky debt in the same way as parent-company equity: since debt is also a claim to the entire …rm, it bene…ts from the certainty e¤ect and is positively correlated with …rm value; issuing debt does not involve the loss of synergies. Similarly, if a …rm issues collateralized debt at the asset/division level or engages in an equity carve-out of a division, this need not imply low quality for the …rm as a whole (correlation e¤ect), and investors do not own a claim to the cash they invest, which resides at the parent company level (certainty e¤ect).
Most existing literature on asset sales is empirical. Jain (1985) , Klein (1986) , Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), and Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) …nd positive market reactions to asset sales. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) show that this positive reaction stems from …nancing rather than operational reasons. Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994) and Bates (2006) examine the use of proceeds. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) analyze operational rather than …nancing motives.
Existing theories consider asset sales as the only source of …nancing and do not compare them to equity, e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , DeMarzo (2005), He (2009), and Kurlat (2010) . Milbradt (2012) and Bond and Leitner (2011) show that selling an asset will a¤ect the market price of the seller's remaining portfolio under mark-tomarket accounting. We show that such correlation e¤ects are stronger for equity: while a partial asset sale may imply a negative valuation of the remaining unsold non-core assets, it need not imply a negative valuation of the …rm. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) also consider both asset sales and equity issuance under information asymmetry, but do not feature the certainty, camou ‡age, or correlation e¤ects. 3 Leland (1994) allows …rms to …nance cash out ‡ows either by equity issuance (in the core analysis) or by asset sales (in an extension), but not to choose between the two. In Strebulaev (2007) , asset sales are assumed to be always preferred to equity issuance, which is a last resort. Other papers model asset sales as a business decision (equivalent to disinvestment) and do not feature information asymmetry. In Morellec (2001) , asset sales occur if the marginal product of the asset is less than its (exogenous) Since a partial asset sale can be interpreted as a carve-out, our paper is also related to the carve-out literature. Nanda (1991) also notes that non-core assets may be uncorrelated with the core business and that this may motivate a …rm to issue subsidiary equity. In his model, correlation is always zero and the information asymmetry of core and non-core assets is identical. Our model allows for general correlations and information asymmetries, as well as synergies, enabling us to generate the three e¤ects. 4 This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the general model. Sections 2 and 3 study the positive and negative correlation cases respectively. Section 4 analyzes extensions, Section 5 discusses empirical implications, and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs and other peripheral material.
The Model
The model consists of two types of risk-neutral agent: …rms, which raise …nancing, and investors, who provide …nancing and set prices. The …rm is run by a manager, who has private information about the …rm's type = (q; k). If a …rm is of type , we also say that the manager is of type . 5 The type consists of two dimensions. The …rst is the …rm's quality q 2 fH; Lg, which measures the standalone (common) value of its assets. The prior probability that q = H is 2 (
; 1). The second dimension is a synergy parameter k U k; k , where 1 < k 0, k 0, and k and q are uncorrelated. This parameter measures the additional (private) value created by the existing owner.
The …rm comprises two assets. The core business has value C q , where C H > C L , and the non-core business has value A q . 6 Where there is no ambiguity, we use the term "assets"to refer to the non-core business. We consider two speci…cations of the model. The …rst is A H A L , so that the two assets are positively correlated. The second is resale value. In Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011), disinvestment occurs if the cost of external …nance is high relative to the marginal productivity of capital. While those papers take the cost of …nancing as given, this paper microfounds the determinants of the cost of equity …nance versus asset sales. 4 Empirically, Allen and McConnell (1998) study how the market reaction to carve-outs depends on the use of proceeds. Schipper and Smith (1986) show that equity issuance leads to negative abnormal returns, but carve-outs lead to positive returns. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) …nd positive market reactions to carve-outs, and Slovin and Sushka (1997) study the implications of parent and subsidiary equity issuance on the stock prices of both the parent and the subsidiary. 5 Since the manager and …rm are interchangeable, we use both the personal pronoun "he" and the impersonal pronoun "its" to refer to the …rm. 6 The values C q and A q represent asset values net of liabilities, and so our model also incorporates information asymmetry about a …rm's liabilities. For example, if a …rm has unknown litigation liabilities at the parent company level, a purchaser of one of its factories is not exposed to them.
A L > A H , so the assets are negatively correlated. In both cases, we assume:
i.e. H has a higher total value even if A H < A L . In MM, the key driver of …nancing is information asymmetry. The distinction between the two cases of A H A L and A H < A L shows that it is not only the information asymmetry of the non-core asset that matters (jA H A L j), but also its correlation with the core asset (sign (A H A L )).
We consider an individual …rm, which must raise …nancing of F . 7 The cash raised remains on the …rm's balance sheet. This modeling treatment nests any …nancing need that increases equity value by an amount F in expectation, independent of q, such as replenishing capital, repaying debt, paying dividends, or …nancing an uncertain investment whose expected value is uncorrelated with q. In Section 4.1, the investment return is correlated with …rm quality and thus exhibits information asymmetry. We currently treat the …nancing need F as exogenous. In MM, the …rm has the option not to raise …nancing and instead to forgo investment; their goal was to show that information asymmetry can deter investment by hindering …nancing. Since this e¤ect is already well-known, our focus instead is the choice between asset sales and equity to meet a given …nancing need. In Section 4.2, we give …rms the choice of whether to raise …nancing and allow …nancing needs to be privately known.
The …rm can raise F by selling either non-core assets or equity; it cannot sell the core asset as it is essential to the …rm. (In Appendix B, we relax this assumption.) We specify F min (A L ; A H ), so that the …nancing can be raised entirely through either source. 8 We assume that the …rm uses a single source. This can be motivated by the transactions costs of using multiple sources. There are no taxes, and any transactions costs are the same for both sources. Firms cannot raise …nancing in excess of the requirement F ; this assumption can be justi…ed by forces outside the model such as agency costs of free cash ‡ow. The non-core asset is perfectly divisible so partial asset sales are possible. We do not feature nonlinearities as they will mechanically lead to the source of …nancing depending on the amount required. If a …rm sells non-core assets worth Y , its fundamental value 7 The amount of …nancing F does not depend on the source of …nancing: F must be raised regardless of whether the …rm sells assets or equity. In bank capital regulation, equity issuance leads to a superior improvement in capital ratios than asset sales and so F does depend on the source of …nancing. We do not consider this e¤ect here as the e¤ect will be straightforward: it will encourage H towards the source that reduces the amount of …nancing required, and thus force L to follow in order to pool. 8 Some of the analysis in the paper will derive bounds on F for various equilibria to be satis…ed. We have veri…ed that none of these bounds are inconsistent with F < min (A L ; A H ).
falls by Y (1 + k). Thus, the case of k > (<) 0 represents synergies (dissynergies), where the asset is worth more (less) to the current owner than a potential purchaser. That k 0 allows for asset sales to be motivated by operational reasons (dissynergies) rather than only …nancing reasons. 9 In addition to synergies, k > 0 can also arise if investment in assets is costly to reverse (e.g. Abel and Eberly (1996) ). Formally, a …rm of type issues a claim X 2 fE; Ag, where X = E represents equity and X = A assets. Investors infer based on X. These inferences a¤ect both the …rm's stock price and the terms of …nancing (and thus fundamental value). Investors are perfectly competitive and price both the claim being sold and the …rm's stock at their expected values conditional upon X. 10 The manager maximizes …rm value; in the negative correlation case of Section 3, he also cares about the stock price. A useful feature of the framework is that only quality q, and not synergy k, directly a¤ects the investor's valuation of a claim and thus the price paid. This allows our model to incorporate two dimensions of …rm type -quality and synergy -while retaining tractability. We sometimes use the term "H" or "H-…rm" to refer to a high-quality …rm regardless of its synergy parameter, and similarly for "L" or "L-…rm". "Capital gain/loss" refers to the gain/loss resulting from the common value component of the asset value only, and "fundamental gain/loss"refers to the change in the …rm's overall value, which consists of both the capital gain/loss and any loss of (dis)synergies. For equity issuance, the capital gain/loss equals the fundamental gain/loss.
We solve for pure strategy equilibria. 11 We use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ("PBE") solution concept, where: (i) Investors have a belief about which types issue which claim X; (ii) The price of the claim being issued equals its expected value, conditional on investors' beliefs in (i); (iii) Each manager type chooses to issue the claim X that maximizes his objective function, given investors'beliefs; (iv) Investors' beliefs satisfy Bayes'rule. In addition to the PBE, beliefs on claims X issued o¤ the equilibrium path satisfy the Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion ("IC").
We …rst analyze the positive correlation version of the model (A H A L ) and then move to negative correlation (A L > A H ).
Positive Correlation
We …rst consider pooling equilibria (P E), which are of two types: an asset-pooling equilibrium (AP E) and an equity-pooling equilibrium (EP E). We then move to semiseparating equilibria (SE). The analysis studies the conditions under which the di¤er-ent equilibria are sustainable, to predict when …rms will use each …nancing channel.
Pooling Equilibrium, All Firms Sell Assets
We consider a P E in which all …rms sell assets, supported by the o¤-equilibrium path belief (OEPB) that an equity issuer is of type L; k . Assets are valued at
If equity is sold (o¤ the equilibrium path), it is valued at E L , where
is the value of equity for a …rm of quality q. The F term arises because the cash raised enters the balance sheet, and so new shareholders own a claim to it. 12 The fundamental values of H and L are respectively given by:
An L-…rm enjoys a capital gain of
by selling low-quality assets at a pooled price. However, it loses the synergies from the asset. If
then even the L-…rm with the greatest synergies, type L; k , is willing to sell assets, since the capital gain exceeds the synergy loss. If (5) is violated, synergies are suf…ciently high that L; k will not sell assets, despite the capital gain, and so AP E cannot hold. Equation (5) is necessary and su¢ cient for all L-…rms not to deviate. H-…rms su¤er a capital loss of F
in addition to any loss of synergies, and thus may deviate to equity. If they do so, fundamental value becomes:
The no-deviation ("ND") condition is that (6) (3). This condition is most stringent for type H; k . Thus, no H-…rms will deviate if:
Condition (7) is equivalent to the "unit cost of …nancing"being lower for assets, i.e.
where the numerator on each side is the value of the claim being sold to the …rm, and the denominator is the price that investors pay for that claim. There are three forces that determine H; k 's incentives to deviate. The …rst is whether assets or equity exhibit greater information asymmetry (
This e¤ect is a natural extension of the MM principle that high-quality …rms wish to issue safe claims. Indeed, without synergies (k = 0), then if
, i.e. assets exhibit su¢ ciently greater information asymmetry, H will deviate to equity: for any F , (8) is violated and so AP E is unsustainable.
The second force is synergies, which are absent in MM. For AP E to hold, …rms must be willing to sell assets despite the loss of synergies. Thus, we require not only assets to be safe, but also the maximum synergy level to be small. (8) is violated and so AP E is unsustainable for any F .
The third force is the amount of …nancing F . This is unique to a model of asset sales and arises because an equity investor has a claim to the cash raised but an asset purchaser does not. Since the value of cash is certain, it mitigates the information asymmetry of equity: the right-hand side ("RHS") of (8) becomes dominated by the term F , which is the same in the numerator and the denominator as it is known, and less dominated by the unknown assets-in-place terms C q and A q . Thus, there is an upper bound on F to prevent deviation, given by (7) . If F exceeds this bound, this "certainty e¤ect" is su¢ ciently strong that H; k deviates to equity. In particular, even if
and k = 0, i.e. assets are safer than equity and there are no synergies, a high F can lead to (8) being violated. Thus, the MM result that …rms issue the claim with the least information asymmetry does not hold. Similarly, the analysis contradicts the conventional wisdom that equity is the riskiest claim. If the amount of …nancing raised is su¢ ciently large, equity is relatively safe.
We now verify whether the OEPB, that an equity issuer is of type L; k , satis…es the IC. This is the case if L; k would issue equity if inferred as H, which occurs if:
It may seem that the IC should be trivial, since deviation leads to a high price for selling equity rather than a pooled price for selling assets. However, if F is large, selling equity is less attractive since the certainty e¤ect reduces the gains from being inferred as H. Thus, we have another upper bound on
, assets exhibit relatively high information asymmetry and synergies are small. Thus, L; k enjoys such a large fundamental gain from asset sales that he will not deviate to equity even if revealed as H: the RHS of (9) is negative and so the IC is violated for any F . 13 Lemma 1 below summarizes the equilibrium. The proof shows that, if and only if
, the IC condition is stronger than the ND condition and thus is the relevant condition for AP E to hold. (All proofs are in Appendix A). Lemma 1. (Positive correlation, pooling equilibrium, all …rms sell assets.) Consider a pooling equilibrium where all …rms sell assets (X = A) and a …rm that issues equity is inferred as type L; k . The prices of assets and equity are A H + (1 )A L and C L + A L + F respectively. The equilibrium is sustainable if the following conditions hold:
where
13 To eliminate an equilibrium with F > F AP E;IC via the IC, we need to show that the only reasonable OEPB is that a deviator is of quality H, which also requires us to show that some …rm of quality H will deviate if revealed good. This will automatically be the case, as (H; 0) will break even rather than su¤ering a capital loss and losing synergies. In all of the other equilibria that we consider, it will similarly be automatic that (H; 0) will deviate if he is revealed good, so we will not need to show this mathematically.
Pooling Equilibrium, All Firms Sell Equity
We now consider the alternative P E in which all …rms issue equity, supported by the OEPB that an asset seller is of type (L; k). Equity is valued at
and if assets are sold (o¤ the equilibrium path), they are valued at A L . As in AP E, L makes a capital gain; however, he will deviate to assets if they are su¢ ciently dissynergistic. Type (L; k) has the greatest incentive to deviate. His ND condition is given by 1 + k
, which can be rewritten
H-…rms will not deviate if:
, the inequality in (12) would change sign and F would have to be less than a negative number. Intuitively, if dissynergies are too strong, (H; k) will deviate to asset sales. In contrast to Section 2.1, H's ND condition (12) now imposes a lower bound on F . This also results from the certainty e¤ect. If F is high, H su¤ers a small loss from equity issuance, and so will not deviate.
The OEPB, that an asset seller is of type (L; k), satis…es the IC if
The denominator is positive, and so the lower bound can always be satis…ed for some F : unlike in AP E, there is no necessary condition. Lemma 2 below summarizes the equilibrium.
Lemma 2. (Positive correlation, pooling equilibrium, all …rms sell equity.) Consider a pooling equilibrium where all …rms sell equity (X = E) and a …rm that sells assets is inferred as type (L; k). The prices of assets and equity are A L and
This equilibrium is sustainable if the following conditions hold:
;
(ii) F F EP E , where
Semi-Separating Equilibria
In a SE, the …nancing choice depends on the synergy parameter k: there is a cuto¤ k q where any …rm below (above) the cuto¤ sells assets (equity). In this subsection we thus assume that k is strictly greater than k: in the limit case of k = k = 0, there is no synergy parameter to separate along. H and L can use di¤erent cuto¤ rules, so separation will be along both type dimensions. While investors do not directly care about k (as it only a¤ects private values), the synergy cuto¤s a¤ect the expected quality (common value) of the claims. Using Bayes' rule, the prices paid for sold assets and issued equity are, respectively:
A type (q; k) will prefer equity if and only if its unit cost of …nancing is no greater:
The cuto¤ k q is that which allows (17) to hold with equality. Thus, it is de…ned by:
Although k q is not attainable in closed form, we can study whether k H 7 k L . Since only the Cq+Aq+F Aq term on the RHS depends on q, the higher cuto¤ k q will belong to the quality q for which this term is higher. Thus, k H > k L if and only if
Condition (19) is intuitive. It requires the certainty e¤ect-adjusted information asymmetry to be higher for equity, which in turn requires F to be low. H dislikes information asymmetry as it increases his capital loss; conversely, L likes information asymmetry. Thus, if F falls, equity becomes less (more) attractive to H (L); therefore, the threshold synergy below which H sells assets is higher.
The di¤erent cuto¤s in turn a¤ect the valuations. If k H > k L , H is more willing to sell assets than L. Thus, asset sales are a positive signal of quality, and so the asset price (15) is higher than in the AP E (2). As a result, L-…rms who sell assets make an even greater capital gain. Their sale of assets is motivated by overvaluation: the assets are low-quality and have a low common value. However, they are able to disguise the sale as instead being motivated by operational reasons, by pooling with H-…rms who are indeed selling for operational reasons (the assets are dissynergistic and thus have a low private value, but are high-quality and have a high common value). Thus, they receive a higher price than under AP E, where …nancing choices are independent of synergies and no such disguise is possible. We call this the "camou ‡age e¤ect".
The camou ‡age e¤ect interacts with the certainty e¤ect. The amount required F changes the cuto¤s and thus the quality of assets and equity sold in equilibrium, in turn a¤ecting their prices. If F > F , (19) is violated: the certainty e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong that equity is more attractive to H (k H < k L ). More H …rms sell equity, increasing (decreasing) the quality and price of equity (assets) sold. Indeed, when F > F , we have k H < 0: since assets exhibit greater information asymmetry, H will retain them even if they are mildly dissynergistic (and when F < F , we have k H > 0, so H will sell assets even if they are mildly synergistic). Now, L-…rms achieve camou ‡age by selling equity: they pool with H-…rms who issue equity not because it is of low quality, but because they do not wish to part with synergistic assets.
The above results are summarized in Lemma 3 below, which also gives necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a SE to hold. Lemma 3. (Positive correlation, semi-separating equilibrium): Consider a semi-separating equilibrium where quality q sells assets if k k q and sells equity if k > k q , where k q is de…ned by (18) . We have the following cases:
The prices of assets and equity are given by (15) and (16) respectively. A full semi-separating equilibrium where both qualities q strictly separate (k < k q < k so that both cuto¤s are interior) is sustainable under the following conditions:
and a su¢ cient condition
and a su¢ cient condition is 1 + k
A partial semi-separating equilibrium where H's cuto¤ is at a boundary is sustainable in the following cases:
and if
Lemma 3 shows that it is the relative importance of operational motives (determined by the absolute values of k and k) compared to certainty e¤ect-adjusted information asymmetry (determined by the distance of F from F ) that governs whether SE is sustainable. In a SE, both claims are issued and one claim will be associated more with L. If F is extreme (very low or very high), information asymmetry is strong, and so issuing the claim associated with L leads to a large capital loss. If synergies are too weak to o¤set this loss, …rms pool. In contrast, if F close to F and k or k is extreme, synergy motives are strong relative to information asymmetry, and so …rms of the same quality issue di¤erent claims depending on k. We thus have a full semiseparating equilibrium (F SE), where …rms of both quality separate. For example, if
, which requires high k (strong synergies) and high F (while still satisfying F < F , so F close to F ) so that
on the RHS is low via the certainty e¤ect. In the intermediate case, where synergies are moderate relative to information asymmetry, we have a partial semi-separating equilibrium (P SE) where all H-…rms issue the same claim, regardless of k, and L-…rms strictly separate. Regardless of whether we have a F SE or P SE, it remains the case that if F > F (the certainty e¤ect is strong), we have k H < 0 and k H < k L (H prefers equity); if F < F (the certainty e¤ect is weak), we have k H > 0 and k H > k L (H prefers assets).
Appendix C shows that, if synergies are extreme, a P SE is sustainable where all L-…rms issue the same claim and H-…rms strictly separate. This equilibrium requires synergies to be so strong that they swamp information asymmetry, and so no L-…rm deviates even though it would be inferred as H. Since the paper considers the trade-o¤ between information asymmetry and synergies, and this case requires synergies to be so strong that they dominate the trade-o¤, we defer the analysis to an Appendix. The intuition behind these equilibria are similar to the P SEs considered in Lemma 3.
Comparing the Equilibria
We now compare the su¢ cient conditions for each equilibrium to be sustainable. The results are given in Proposition 1 below:
, at least one pooling equilibrium is sustainable. If both inequalities hold:
(ia) An asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if F F AP E .
(ib) An equity-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if F F EP E .
F F AP E , both pooling equilibria are sustainable.
(ii) If
), a partial semi-separating equilibrium where H pools on assets is sustainable. The upper bound
), a partial semi-separating equilibrium where H pools on equity is sustainable. The lower bound
), a full semi-separating equilibrium where
Part (i) of Proposition 1 states that pooling equilibria are sustainable if synergies are weak. Intuitively, deviation from a P E leads to being inferred as L; if synergies are not strong enough to outweigh the capital loss, deviation is ruled out and so the P E holds. When the amount of …nancing required increases, …rms switch from selling assets (AP E) to issuing equity (EP E), since the certainty e¤ect strengthens.
14 Thus, 14 When F becomes too high (
no longer holds and EP E is the type of claim issued depends not only on the inherent characteristics of the claim (its information asymmetry and synergies) but also the amount of …nancing required. In standard theories, the type of security issued only depends on its characteristics (information asymmetry or overvaluation), unless one assumes nonlinearities such as limited debt capacity. Here, F can be fully raised by either source. It may seem that, since …nancing is a motive for asset sales, greater …nancing needs should lead to more asset sales. This result is also delivered by investment models where …nancial constraints induce disinvestment or reduce investment. However, here, if F rises su¢ ciently, the …rm may sell fewer assets, since it substitutes into an alternative source of …nancing: equity. Surprisingly, greater …nancial constraints may improve real e¢ ciency as …rms hold onto their synergistic assets. 15 One interesting case is a single-segment …rm, which corresponds to C q = A q , i.e. core and non-core assets are one and the same. Since the information asymmetry of the …rm equals that of the non-core asset, the certainty e¤ect will push the information asymmetry of equity lower, and so lead to a preference for equity.
Parts (ii) and (iii) show that, if synergies are moderate, partial semi-separating equilibria may hold. Just as in the P Es, all H-…rms sell assets (equity) for low (high) F . The di¤erence is that, now, some L-…rms are willing to deviate. Even though they are revealed as low-quality, this is outweighed by the synergy motives.
Parts (iv) and (v) show that full semi-separating equilibria may hold if synergies are strong relative to information asymmetry. Even if the conditions in part (i) hold (synergies are weak and so P Es are sustainable), a F SE may also be sustainable if F is close to F so that information asymmetry is also weak. 16 Regardless of the equilibrium (P E, F SE, or P SE), it remains robust that H prefers assets (equity) for low (high) F , because the certainty e¤ect reduces the information asymmetry of equity. Combining all parts of Proposition 1 together, if we …x synergies such that
, as F rises, we move from an AP E, to a region in which both P Es hold, then to EP E, and …nally to a P SE where all H-…rms sell equity (when F becomes very high, L-…rms make little capital gain from equity, and so those with highly dissynergistic assets sell them). In addition, in a neighborhood around F we also have F SE, so three equilibria (AP E, EP E, and F SE) can be sustained. If we …x synergies such unsustainable. Due to the certainty e¤ect, the information asymmetry of equity becomes second-order, and so (L; k) will sell assets. 15 In particular, if k = 0, all asset sales reduce total surplus since there are no dissynergies. Equity issuance does not a¤ect real e¢ ciency as it leads to a pure wealth transfer between investors and …rms; asset sales a¤ect real e¢ ciency due to the di¤erence between common and private values. 16 Note that, when the conditions in part (i) are satis…ed, P SE is unsustainable for any F .
, as F rises, we move from a P SE where all H-…rms sell assets, to a F SE, then to EP E, and …nally to a P SE where all H-…rms sell equity. The change in equilibrium as F changes illustrates that H prefers assets (equity) if F is low (high). In addition, it shows how …rm boundaries are a¤ected by …nancing needs.
If we …x F and increase synergies in absolute terms, we move from a P E to a P SE and …nally to a F SE. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) present a model showing that operational motives for asset sales are procyclical, and empirically …nd that asset sales are indeed procyclical. This procyclicality may arise not only because operational motives rise in booms, but also because L is able to camou ‡age asset sales as being operationally-motivated in booms. In our model, an increase in operational motives corresponds to k becoming more negative. Speci…cally, if F is high, with high k (weak dissynergies) we have an EP E in which there is no camou ‡age e¤ect. As k falls, we move to an SE where camou ‡age is possible, since some H-…rms are selling assets due to operational reasons. Markets in which H sells assets due to negative k are deep, similar to the notion of "market depth" in Kyle (1985) . The liquidity traders in Kyle are analogous to high-quality asset sellers: they are selling assets for reasons other than them having a low common value. The presence of such traders allows informed speculators, who do have assets with a low common value, to pro…t by selling them. 17 Note that the regions in Proposition 1 do not overlap. 18 This is because the Proposition gives su¢ cient conditions for the equilibria to exist, which are not necessary.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that the necessary conditions do overlap, i.e. there is no set of parameters for which all necessary conditions are violated.
Negative Correlation
We now turn to the case of negative correlation. Since A L > A H , we now use the term "high (low)-quality assets" to refer to the assets of L (H). Note that negative correlation is a mild condition: it only means that high-quality …rms are not universally high-quality, as they may have some low-quality assets. It does not require the values of the divisions to covary negatively with each other (e.g. that a market upswing 17 Grenadier, Malenko, and Strebulaev (2012) have a similar notion of camou ‡age, which they dub "blending in with the crowd," in a di¤erent setting. If an industry-wide shock forces good managers to abandon their projects for exogenous reasons, bad managers take the opportunity to abandon their bad projects without their low quality being revealed.
E[A]
A L (the upper bound on 1 + k for AP E) is less than
(the lower bound on 1 + k for P SE) and
(the upper bound on 1 + k for P SE) is less than
(the lower bound on 1 + k for F SE), and similarly for the bound on 1 + k.
helps one division and hurts the other). It is reasonable for the market to know the correlation of the asset with the core business (even if it does not observe quality) simply by observing the type of asset traded. For example, the value of airplanes in a bank's leasing division is unlikely to be highly correlated with the bank as a whole, but the value of mortgages will be.
In this section, the manager's objective function places weight ! on the …rm's stock price and 1 ! on fundamental value. 19 We introduce stock price concerns because, with negative correlation, there is now a trade-o¤ involved in selling assets: being inferred as H maximizes the market value, but being inferred as L maximizes proceeds and thus fundamental value. Thus, without stock price concerns, no P E is sustainable.
Pooling Equilibrium, All Firms Sell Assets
As in Section 2.1, we consider an AP E, supported by the OEPB that an equity issuer is of type L; k . As before, sold assets are valued at
issued equity is valued at E L . An asset seller has a stock price of E [C + A] F E [k]
and an equity issuer is priced at C L + A L . The stock price of an asset seller takes into account the expected loss of synergies from the sale,
By deviating, L avoids the capital loss from selling highly-valued assets at a pooled price as well as any loss of synergies, but su¤ers a low stock price. Thus, he will only cooperate if his concern for the stock price ! is high. Since L; k is most likely to deviate, all L-…rms will cooperate if:
If (21) holds, it is automatic that all H-…rms will not deviate: their incentives to deviate are weaker as they are making a capital gain by selling low-quality assets. Thus, (21) is necessary and su¢ cient for no …rms to deviate.
The lower bound given by (21) is relatively loose. It is easy to rule out a deviation to equity. Issuing equity not only leads to a low price (of C L + A L ) on the equity being sold (as in MM), but also implies a low valuation (of C L + A L ) for the rest of the …rm. This is because the equity being sold is necessarily perfectly correlated with the …rm.
The second e¤ect is absent in MM, since the manager only cares about fundamental value and not the stock price.
The IC is trivially satis…ed. Type L; k will indeed deviate to equity if revealed H: his stock price will rise, he will receive a capital gain by selling equity for a high price (compared to his current loss on assets) and he avoids the loss of synergies k 0.
The results of this subsection are summarized in Lemma 4 below:
Lemma 4. (Negative correlation, pooling equilibrium, all …rms sell assets.) Consider a pooling equilibrium where all …rms sell assets (X H = X L = A) and a …rm that sells equity is inferred as type L; k . The prices of assets and equity are A H + (1 )A L and E L respectively. The stock prices of asset sellers and equity issuers are
The bound is increasing in F , so again the choice of …nancing depends on the amount required. However, F plays a di¤erent role here than in the positive correlation model, where it drove the certainty e¤ect. Here, a greater F means that L's capital loss from pooling is sustained over a larger base, increasing the fundamental value motive and requiring higher stock price concerns ! to maintain indi¤erence. Put di¤erently, if F is high, L su¤ers such a large capital loss from selling assets that it prefers to "bite the bullet"and issue equity despite the low stock price.
Pooling Equilibrium, All Firms Sell Equity
We next consider a P E in which all …rms sell equity, supported by the OEPB that an asset seller is of type (L; k). 20 As before, issued equity is valued at E[C + A] + F and sold assets are valued at A L . The stock price is E [C + A] for an equity issuer and C L + A L F k for an asset seller. By deviating, H avoids the capital loss from equity and gets rid of a dissynergistic asset, but su¤ers a low stock price from being inferred as L. Since (H; k) is most likely to deviate, all H-…rms will cooperate if:
If (22) holds, it is automatic that all L-…rms will not deviate: their incentives to deviate are weaker as they are making a capital gain by issuing equity. Thus, (22) is necessary and su¢ cient for all …rms not to deviate. Comparing (22) with (21), the ND condition in AP E, the EP E condition is harder to satisfy. In AP E, deviation to equity leads to a low price of C L + A L not only on the equity sold, but also on the rest of the …rm. Here, deviation to asset sales leads to a low price of C L + A L F k on the …rm, but a high price of A L on the asset sold, since it is not a carbon copy: the "correlation e¤ect."
Unlike in Section 3.1, the IC is non-trivial, since deviation to asset sales causes (L; k) to su¤er a capital loss. We require:
This is also a lower bound. The numerator represents the fundamental loss that L su¤ers from deviating to asset sales, which arises if the capital loss from selling undervalued assets exceeds the gain from getting rid of a dissynergistic asset. If this loss is positive, he will only deviate if ! is su¢ ciently high.
The IC condition (23) is stronger than the ND condition (22) if and only if:
where N 1 and N 2 are the parenthetical terms in the numerators of (23) and (22), i.e.:
Lemma 5 below summarizes the equilibrium.
Lemma 5. (Negative correlation, pooling equilibrium, all …rms sell equity.) Consider a pooling equilibrium where all …rms sell assets (X H = X L = A) and a …rm that sells assets is inferred as type (L; k). The prices of assets and equity are given by A L and
The stock prices of asset sellers and equity issuers are C L + A L F k and E [C + A], respectively. This equilibrium is sustainable if ! ! EP E , where
if (24) holds
if (24) does not hold.
There are two e¤ects of increasing F on the lower bounds. The base e¤ect makes pooling harder to sustain: the capital loss is su¤ered o¤ a higher base, and so increases H's incentive to deviate. Thus, the lower bound tightens, i.e. increases. This is the same e¤ect as in AP E. The second e¤ect is speci…c to EP E: increasing F reduces the capital loss from pooling, due to the certainty e¤ect, making pooling easier to sustain. The second e¤ect is always smaller, and so the bounds increase overall.
Comparing the Pooling Equilibria
We now study the conditions under which each P E is sustainable. The goal of the comparison is to show that the correlation e¤ect leads to asset sales being preferred to equity. Since this correlation e¤ect does not depend on synergies, we undertake the comparison for k = k = 0. 21 The results are given in Proposition 2 below: (21) and (25) ! < 1, both the asset-pooling and equity-pooling equilibria are sustainable.
The thresholds ! AP E;N D;L and ! EP E are both increasing in F .
Proposition 2 shows that, with negative correlation, asset sales are more common than equity. The range of !'s over which EP E is sustainable is a strict subset of that over which AP E is sustainable. This correlation e¤ect is absent in a standard …nancing model of security issuance, because both debt and equity are positively correlated with …rm value. Thus, the issuance of debt may imply that debt is low-quality, and thus the remainder of the …rm is also low-quality.
The preference for asset sales analysis points to an interesting bene…t of diversi…-cation. Stein (1997) notes that an advantage of holding assets that are not perfectly correlated is "winner-picking": a conglomerate can increase investment in the division with the best investment opportunities at the time. Our model suggests that another advantage is "loser-picking": a …rm can sell a low-quality asset without implying a low value for the rest of the …rm. Non-core assets are a form of …nancial slack and may even be preferable to debt capacity: debt is typically positively correlated with …rm value, so a debt issue may lead the market to infer that both the debt being sold and the remainder of the …rm are low-quality.
The analysis also points to a new notion of investment reversibility. Standard theories (e.g. Abel and Eberly (1996) ) model reversibility as the real value that can be salvaged by undoing or selling an investment, which in turn depends on the asset's technology. Here, reversibility depends on the market's inference of …rm quality if an investment is sold, and thus the correlation between the asset and the rest of the …rm.
Semi-Separating Equilibrium
As in Section 2.3, we have a SE characterized by a cuto¤ k q . The prices paid for assets and equity are again given by (15) and (16) . Since the manager now places weight on the …rm's stock price, we need to calculate the stock prices of asset sellers and equity issuers. These are, respectively:
The stock price of an asset seller includes an additional term,
, which re ‡ects the expected synergy loss (which may be negative).
Note that E [kjX = A] < E[k], since the decision to sell assets suggests that synergies are low. The stock price is higher for an asset seller than an equity issuer (E [V jX = A] > E [V jX = E]) if and only if:
(28) The cuto¤ k q for a particular quality q is de…ned by:
. (29) Only the parenthetical term on the RHS di¤ers by quality q. Ignoring k, this term will be higher for L, and so k H > k L . This is intuitive: since H has low-quality assets but high-quality equity, he is more willing to sell assets. Under positive correlation, k H > k L only if assets exhibit less (certainty e¤ect-adjusted) information asymmetry than equity, as then the capital loss from asset sales is lower. With negative correlation, the capital loss from asset sales is always lower since it is negative (i.e., a capital gain), and so we always have k H > k L . From (26) and (27), k H > k L implies that asset (equity) sales lead to a positive (negative) inference about …rm quality, i.e. Pr (q = HjX = A) > Pr (q = HjX = E), and so the left-hand side ("LHS") of (28) positive. Thus, in the absence of the additional term F E [kjX = A] on the RHS, (28) will hold: the stock price is higher for an asset seller, since H is more likely to sell assets than L. However, if synergies become extremely strong so that F E [kjX = A] is very large, this could theoretically lead to a violation of (28) : an asset seller is expected to lose very large synergies, swamping the positive quality inference. Since this paper considers the tradeo¤ between information asymmetry and synergies, to ensure that synergies are not so strong that they dominate the trade-o¤ so that being revealed as low-quality increases the stock price, we assume that (28) holds. A su¢ cient, but unnecessary, condition is symmetric synergies (k = k). 22 In turn, (28) implies that the LHS of (29) is positive.
Setting q = H on the RHS yields k H > 0 for the equality to hold. Intuitively, H will sell assets even if they are moderately synergistic, as he bene…ts from both the capital gain and the higher stock price. The amount of …nancing F has three e¤ects on the cuto¤s in (29) . To illustrate, consider L's decision. First, an increase in F augments the certainty e¤ect and makes equity less attractive, because L enjoys a smaller capital gain. This tends to increase k L . Second, an increase in F augments fundamental value considerations due to the base e¤ect, decreasing k L . Third, F multiplies the expected synergy loss of an asset seller. If the expected synergy loss E [kjX = A] is negative (on average, sold assets are dissynergistic), a higher F magni…es this expected gain, increasing the stock price reaction to selling assets and raising k L .
In addition to k H > k L always holding, a second contrast with the positive correlation case is that it is possible to have separation purely by quality and not by synergy, i.e. k H = k and k L = k, where all high (low)-quality …rms sell assets (equity). We use SE q to denote a SE by quality only. Under positive correlation, SE q is unsustainable as (L; k) will deviate to assets and enjoy a capital gain plus a loss of dissynergies.
Here, such a deviation leads to a capital loss. Indeed, SE q is sustainable if both of the following conditions hold:
The lower bound on ! ensures that stock price concerns deter H; k from deviating to retain its synergistic assets. 23 There are three e¤ects of changing F on the lower bound, analogous to the three e¤ects on the cuto¤s in (29) . First, a rise in F increases ! SE q ;H due to the certainty e¤ect (reducing
). Second, it reduces it due to the base e¤ect. Third, F multiplies the expected synergy loss of an asset seller. If the expected synergy loss k+k 2 is negative, a higher F magni…es this expected gain, reducing ! SE q ;H .
The upper bound ensures that (L; k) will not deviate.
, i.e. the bene…ts of getting rid of a dissynergistic asset exceed the capital loss from selling high-quality assets, deviation to asset sales yields (L; k) a fundamental gain and so SE q can never
, deviation yields (L; k) a fundamental loss. Since it also leads to a stock price increase, ! must be low to deter deviation. Unlike the lower bound, there are only two e¤ects of changing F on the upper bound as there is no certainty e¤ect. The range of !'s that satisfy (30) and (31) is increasing in k and decreasing in k: the weaker the synergy motive, the easier it is to sustain SE q . 23 If
, then the loss of synergies is less than the capital loss that H; k would su¤er by issuing equity. Thus, H's fundamental value and stock price are both higher under asset sales, and the lower bound on ! is trivially satis…ed.
In SE q , assets are sold for the lowest possible price of A H and equity is issued at the lowest price of C L + A L , so there are no capital gains or losses. H's assets are correctly assessed as "lemons," and so the market timing motive for …nancing (e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2002)) does not exist. However, H is still willing to sell assets despite the lack of a capital gain, due to the positive stock price reaction. Thus, the correlation e¤ect -and its implications for the desirability of …nancing through asset sales -manifests in two ways. First, AP E is sustainable over a greater range of parameters than EP E. Second, SE q is sustainable, unlike in the positive-correlation model. 24 Finally, we may have P SEs where one quality pools and the other separates. As in the positive correlation case, if k is low, we have a P SE where all H-…rms sell assets and L-…rms strictly separate. Unlike the positive correlation case, we cannot have a P SE where H-…rms issue equity and L-…rms strictly separate. Such an equilibrium would require some L-…rms to be willing to sell assets but all H-…rms not to be. However, since H's assets are lower-quality under negative correlation, H is more willing to sell assets than L. Similarly, if k and k are high and ! is low, we have a P SE where all L-…rms issue equity and H-…rms strictly separate. We cannot have a P SE where all L-…rms sell assets and H-…rms strictly separate: since some H-…rms are issuing equity, L-…rms will enjoy both a capital gain and a stock price increase by deviating to equity. Thus, the only feasible P SEs involve all H-…rms selling assets, or all L-…rms issuing equity, which is intuitive since H's assets and L's equity are both low-quality.
The results of this section are summarized in Lemma 6 below.
Lemma 6. (Negative correlation, semi-separating equilibrium.) Assume that (28) holds.
(i) A full semi-separating equilibrium is sustainable where quality q sells assets if k k q and equity if k > k q , where k q is de…ned by (29) , if k is su¢ ciently low and k is su¢ ciently high. We have k H > k L and k H > 0; the sign of k L depends on parameter values. The prices of assets and equity are given by (26) and (27) respectively.
(ii) A partial semi-separating equilibrium in which all …rms of quality H (L) sell 24 SE q is also featured in the model of Nanda and Narayanan (1999) , where core and non-core assets are always negatively correlated and ! = 0. (If these assets are positively correlated, there is no information asymmetry in their model.) Thus, no pooling equilibria are sustainable in the absence of transactions costs. They assume that the transactions costs of asset sales are higher than for equity issuance, which sometimes supports an EP E but never an AP E: the opposite result to our paper. assets (equity) is sustainable if the following two conditions hold:
(iii) A partial semi-separating equilibrium where all H-…rms sell assets (k H = k) and L-…rms strictly separate (k < k L < k) is sustainable if k is su¢ ciently low, k is su¢ ciently high, and ! > ! SE q ;H .
(iv) A partial semi-separating equilibrium where all L-…rms issue equity (k L = k) and H-…rms strictly separate (k < k H < k) is sustainable if k is su¢ ciently high, k is su¢ ciently high, and ! < ! SE q ;L .
Extensions
This section analyzes extensions of the main model. In Section 4.1, the cash raised is used to …nance an investment whose expected value exhibits information asymmetry, and Section 4.2 allows …rms to have the choice over whether to raise capital. In addition, we have undertaken an extension in which …rms may also sell the core asset. Since the analysis mainly demonstrates the robustness of the core model, rather than generating new results, we defer it to Appendix B. However, we discuss brie ‡y here two robustness results. First, one of the assets (core or non-core) will exhibit more information asymmetry than the other; since equity is a mix of both assets, its information asymmetry will lie in between. Even though equity is never the safest claim, it may still be issued due to the certainty e¤ect. Second, if the core (non-core) asset is positively (negatively) correlated with …rm value, the …rm is able to choose the correlation of the asset that it sells, whereas the analysis thus far has considered either the positive correlation case or the negative correlation case. Appendix B shows that a P E in which all …rms sell the non-core asset is easier to sustain than one in which all …rms sell equity, and one in which all …rms sell the core asset. Thus, the correlation e¤ect continues to apply when …rms can choose the correlation of the assets they sell.
Cash Used For Investment
In this section, the cash raised is used to …nance an investment whose expected value exhibits information asymmetry. To make the e¤ects of investment as clear as possible, we will focus on the no-synergies case of k = k = 0. We also assume that:
Equation (32) states that the information asymmetry of assets is not too high compared to equity. If (32) is violated, the information asymmetry of assets is so high that, in the core model, EP E is always sustainable regardless of F (the RHS of (12) is negative). We discuss the e¤ect of relaxing (32) at the end of this section. Since all agents are risk-neutral, only expected values matter. Thus, the model is unchanged if we simply make the investment volatile, so that its payo¤ is a random variable with an expected value independent of q. 25 For the investment to a¤ect the analysis, it must vary with q so that it exhibits information asymmetry -a critically di¤erent concept to volatility. We thus assume that F is used to …nance an investment with expected value R q = F (1 + r q ), where r H 0 and r L 0: since there are no agency problems, only positive-NPV investments are undertaken (as in MM). We allow for both r H r L and r H < r L . The former is more common as high-quality …rms typically have superior investment opportunities, but r H < r L can occur as a …rm that is currently weak may have greater room for improvement.
Intuitively, it would seem that, if r H r L , the uncertainty of investment will exacerbate the uncertainty of assets in place, weakening the certainty e¤ect and making equity less desirable. However, we will show that this is not necessarily the case. We consider the case of positive correlation here; the case of negative correlation is very similar to the core model and is in Appendix D. Appendix D also allows for r H < 0 and r L < 0 and shows that the core intuitions are unchanged.
We …rst consider AP E. The analog of (8), H's ND condition, is now:
As is intuitive, C q and R q (= F (1 + r q )) enter symmetrically in all expressions: an equity investor receives a share of C, R, and A, but an asset purchaser receives only a share of A. From (33), H will not deviate if:
Since (32) implies
, the RHS of (34) is positive. We …rst consider the case of
, i.e. the information asymmetry of investment is not too high. The LHS of (34) is positive, and so we again have an upper bound on F , given by:
In the core model ( (7)), and setting synergies to zero, the denominator is
. If r L > r H , the denominator of (35) is greater than in the core model, and so it is harder to support AP E. This is intuitive: L's superior growth options counterbalance its inferior assets in place and reduce the information asymmetry of equity, encouraging deviation. One may think that the reverse intuition applies to r H r L , but if
, the denominator of (35) is still higher than in the core model. This intuition is incomplete because …nancing investment has two e¤ects. They can be best seen by the following decomposition of the investment returns:
The …rst, intuitive e¤ect is the F (r H r L ) term which appears in the R H equation only. The value of investment is greater for H and so it su¤ers a greater capital loss from selling equity. However, there is a second e¤ect, captured by the F (1 + r L ) term which is common to both qualities. This increases the certainty e¤ect: since the investment is positive-NPV, an equity investor now has a claim to a larger certain value: F (1 + r L ) rather than F . Put di¤erently, while investors do not know …rm quality, they do know that the funds they provide will increase in value, regardless of quality. Note that equity does not become attractive to investors simply because the …rm is worth more due to its growth opportunities. The growth opportunities are fully priced into the equity issue and are not a "freebie."Instead, the attraction arises because the certain component of the …rm's balance sheet is now greater. Due to this second e¤ect, r H r L is not su¢ cient for the upper bound to relax. Only if
does the …rst e¤ect dominate, loosening the upper bound. Finally, if
1+r H 1+r L , i.e. investment exhibits high information asymmetry, then the LHS of (34) is non-positive and so the ND condition holds for any F .
Another way to view the intuition is as follows. Equityholders obtain a portfolio of assets in place (C + A) and the new investment (R); F determines the weighting of the new investment in this portfolio. H cooperates if his capital loss from asset sales,
, is less than the weighted average loss on this overall portfolio. If both the assets in place and the new investment exhibit higher information asymmetry than non-core assets, i.e.
, then the loss on the portfolio is greater regardless of the weights -hence, H cooperates holds regardless of F . Deviation is only possible if the investment is safer than non-core assets, i.e.
. In this case, the weight placed on the new investment (F ) must be low for the weighted average loss to remain higher for the portfolio, and so for deviation to be ruled out.
Regardless of the speci…c values of r H and r L , in all cases we require F to be below an upper bound. 26 Thus, the result of the core model, that F must be low for AP E to be sustainable, continues to hold when cash is used to …nance an uncertain investment. The equilibrium is summarized in Lemma 7 below. The proof of the Lemma shows that the e¤ect of uncertain investment on the IC condition is similar, and that the IC is always stronger than the ND condition (34).
Lemma 7.
(Positive correlation, pooling equilibrium, all …rms sell assets, cash used for investment.) Consider a pooling equilibrium where all …rms sell assets (X = A) and a …rm that issues equity is inferred as quality L. The prices of assets and equity are
respectively. The equilibrium is sustainable if:
, the asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable for all F .
. Compared to the case where cash remains on the balance sheet (Lemma 1):
, the upper bound on F is tighter and the asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable across a smaller range of F ,
, the upper bound on F is looser and the asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable across a larger range of F .
The e¤ect of using cash for investment is similar in EP E, so we defer the analysis to Appendix D. The comparison of equilibria is summarized in Proposition 3: 26 For 
The thresholds F AP E;I and F EP E;I are both increasing in r H and decreasing in r L . If
we have F EP E;I < F AP E;I . If
, we have F EP E;I < F AP E;I if and only if
Proposition 3 demonstrates the core model's results continue to hold when there is information asymmetry over the use of the cash raised. Regardless of r H and r L , AP E (EP E) is sustainable for low (high) F . As in the core model, the source of …nancing depends on the amount of …nancing required.
In addition to demonstrating robustness, this extension also generates a new prediction. As r H falls and r L rises (the information asymmetry of investment falls), the upper bound on AP E tightens and the lower bound on EP E loosens. Thus, the source of …nancing also depends on the use of …nancing: if the funds will be used for valuable investment even if the …rm is low-quality (r L is high), they are more likely to be raised from equity. The use of …nancing also matters in models of moral hazard (uses more likely to be subject to agency problems will be …nanced by debt rather than equity) or bankruptcy costs (purchases of tangible assets are more likely to …nanced by debt rather than equity); here it matters in a model of pure adverse selection. In addition, our predictions for the use of equity di¤er from a moral hazard model. With moral hazard, if cash is to remain on the balance sheet, equity is undesirable due to the agency costs of free cash ‡ow (Jensen (1986) ). Here, equity is preferred due to the certainty e¤ect.
Appendix D also considers the case in which (32) does not hold. In this rare case, assets exhibit such high information asymmetry that EP E holds in the core model regardless of F . In this case, and if also the information asymmetry of the investment is su¢ ciently higher than assets, equity issuance is always possible unless the weight on the investment is su¢ ciently high that the weighted average information asymmetry (of equity and the new investment) is greater than that of assets. Thus, EP E (AP E) now holds for low (high) F . If either one of the above conditions is not met, we return to the core model's result that EP E holds for high F and AP E for low F .
Capital Raising is a Choice
In the core model, …rms are forced to raise F . This section gives …rms a choice over whether to raise capital. We …rst allow all …rms to have freedom to do nothing, or instead raise capital of F for an investment that returns F (1 + r). 27 We continue to consider the case of positive correlation and reintroduce synergies into the model. The possible equilibria are given in Proposition 4 below:
(All …rms have a choice on whether to raise capital.) If all …rms can either raise equity of F , sell assets of F , or do nothing, we have the following equilibria: (i) The equilibria in Section 2 continue to hold under the conditions in that Section plus an additional lower bound on 1+r. For example, a full semi-separating equilibrium where quality q sells assets if k k q and equity if k > k q holds under the conditions of Lemma 3 plus the additional condition 1 + r >
. The additional lower bounds for the other equilibria are given in Appendix A.
28
(
, we have a semi-separating equilibrium where quality H sells assets if k k H and does nothing if k > k H , and quality L sells assets if k k L and issues equity if k > k L .
A L , the cuto¤ k H is interior and de…ned by
, where
e. all H-…rms do nothing, and k L = 0. (iii) If r = 0, we have the same semi-separating equilibria in part (ii) except that L-…rms with k > k L either issue equity or do nothing.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 shows that the equilibria of the core model are sustainable if the return on investment r is su¢ ciently high. Intuitively, H is only willing to sustain the losses from raising capital if the capital can be put to a su¢ ciently productive use.
Part (ii) shows that if r is low, high-quality …rms with synergistic assets will not raise capital at all, since the return on investment is insu¢ cient to outweigh the loss of synergies from selling assets or the capital loss from issuing equity. However, highquality …rms with dissynergistic assets will sell them for operational reasons. As before, 27 Since the implications of r H 6 = r L have been analyzed in the previous subsection, we set the return on investment to be independent of …rm quality here. 28 The additional lower bounds for the equilibria studied in Appendix C are given in that section.
low-quality …rms sell either equity or assets, depending on their level of synergy. There is no camou ‡age e¤ect with equity: unlike the SE that exists if r is high (part (i)), here equity automatically reveals the …rm as L and leads to a price of E L . In contrast, asset sales may be undertaken either because the asset is low-quality, or because the asset is dissynergistic. This camou ‡age e¤ect means that asset sales can stem from high-as well as low-quality …rms, and so the asset price exceeds A L . We thus have k L 0: low-quality …rms prefer assets to equity, due to the camou ‡age e¤ect. The SE in part (i) exhibits greater real e¢ ciency than that in part (ii) since all …rms are undertaking pro…table investment. It is easier to satisfy the condition for part
), and harder to satisfy the condition for part (ii) ( 
F is high. A high F has bene…cial real consequences: it encourages H to issue equity and invest, because the certainty e¤ect reduces the capital loss from issuing equity.
Part (iii) shows that, if r = 0, even low-quality …rms have no reason to issue equity: they cannot exploit overvaluation since there is no camou ‡age, and they are unable to invest the cash raised. Thus, low-quality …rms with su¢ ciently synergistic assets (k > k L ) are indi¤erent between selling equity and doing nothing. Indeed, there exists an equilibrium where all L-…rms with k > k L do nothing, and so the equity market shuts down: absent an investment opportunity, the only reason to sell equity is if it is low-quality, and so the "no-trade" theorem applies. In contrast, asset sales may be motivated by operational reasons and so the market continues to function. 29 We next consider the case in which high-quality …rms can choose whether to raise …nancing, but low-quality …rms are forced to do so. This is similar to Miller and Rock (1985) , where the need to raise …nancing reveals that a …rm's operations are not generating su¢ cient cash and thus are low-quality. Since some …rms are now forced to raise …nancing, we do not need a pro…table investment opportunity to induce them to do so, and so set r = 0. The equilibrium is given in Proposition 5 below:
Proposition 5. (High-quality …rms have a choice on whether to raise capital, lowquality …rms must raise capital.) Assume r = 0. If H-…rms can either raise capital of F or do nothing, and L-…rms must raise capital of F , we have a semi-separating equilibrium where quality H sells assets if k k H and does nothing if k > k H , and quality L sells assets if k k L and issues equity if k > k L . The cuto¤s k q are de…ned
, where k H < 0 < k L . 29 Note that
, the SEs in parts (i) and (ii) are both sustainable. The …rst equilibrium is sustainable: since some high-quality …rms are selling equity, the equity price is high, which underpins high-quality …rms' willingness to sell equity. The second equilibrium is also sustainable: since no high-quality …rms are selling equity, the equity price is low, which underpins high-quality …rms'reluctance to sell equity.
e. all H-…rms do nothing, and k L = 0.
Proposition 5 shows that the equilibrium of Proposition 4, part (ii), holds in the case in which only low-quality …rms must raise capital. This result also illustrates the camou ‡age e¤ect. Issuing equity immediately reveals a …rm as low-quality, since high-quality …rms do not issue equity: they are not forced to do so (since they have no capital needs) and will not voluntarily do so (since there is no investment opportunity). By selling assets, low-quality …rms can disguise a …nancing need that is motivated by desperation (it needs to raise capital as it is low-quality) as instead being motivated by operational reasons. Thus, we have k L > 0: low-quality …rms prefer to raise capital through selling assets, and will do so even if their assets are synergistic.
Implications
This section brie ‡y discusses the main implications of the model. Some are empirically testable; a subset have already been tested, while others are as yet unexplored and would be interesting to study in future research. In addition, the model generates other implications that may not be immediately linkable to an empirical test. Note that empirical analysis should focus on asset sales that are primarily …nancing-motivated.
The …rst set of empirical implications concerns the determinants of …nancing choice. One determinant is the amount of …nancing required: Proposition 1 shows that equity is preferred for high …nancing needs, because the certainty e¤ect reduces the information asymmetry of equity, while asset sales are preferred for low …nancing needs. Thus, equity issuances should be larger on average than …nancing-motivated asset sales. Moreover, the link between the source of …nancing and the amount required will be stronger where there is less scope for synergies. With low synergies, only pooling equilibria are sustainable and we have the above link. With high synergies, we have a separating equilibrium where some …rms use assets (equity) for high (low) …nancing amounts. Furthermore, with low synergies, …rms will issue the same type of claim for a given …nancing requirement; with high synergies, we should observe greater heterogeneity across …rms in …nancing choices. Estimating the potential for (dis)synergies is di¢ cult. One potential route is to look across the business cycle: Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) argue that operational motives are stronger in booms. An alternative direction is to compare across industries. For example, in the energy industry, asset sales frequently involve self-contained plants which likely have little scope for synergies. In consumer-facing industries with the potential for cross-selling multiple products to the same customer base, operational motives should be stronger.
A second determinant of …nancing choice is use of funds. Proposition 3 demonstrates that equity is more likely in two cases. First, it will be used for purposes with less information asymmetry, such as paying debt or dividends. Thus, a …rm that is raising …nancing due to distress (the need to repay debt) is more likely to issue equity. Second, it will be used to …nance investment, if the investment will likely be signi…cantly positive-NPV even for low-quality …rms (i.e., r L is high). Along the crosssection, growth …rms with good investment opportunities should raise equity. Over the time series, in a strong macroeconomic environment, even low-quality …rms will have good investment projects and so equity is again preferred.
A third determinant of …nancing choice is …rm characteristics. Asset sales are preferred for …rms with negatively-correlated assets due to the correlation e¤ect. Thus, conglomerates are more likely to sell assets than …rms with closely-related divisions.
A second set of empirical implications concerns the market reaction to …nancing. If k H > k L , which always holds in the negative correlation case, and in the positive correlation case under low F , asset sales lead to a positive stock price reaction and equity issuance leads to a negative stock price reaction. Indeed, Jain (1985) , Klein (1986) , Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), and Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995), among others, …nd evidence of the former; a long line of empirical research beginning with Asquith and Mullins (1986) documents the latter.
We now move to implications that may be less readily testable. Firms are more willing to sell assets in deep markets where others are selling for operational reasons, providing camou ‡age. This prediction is harder to test because it is di¢ cult to identify the actual motive for a given asset sale. A more general implication is that there will be multiplier e¤ects: changes in economic conditions that increase operational motives for asset sales will also increase overvaluation-motivated asset sales. The model's implications regarding synergies are also harder to test given the di¢ culty in estimating synergies. Equity issuers are likely to have synergistic assets, and asset sellers are likely to be parting with dissynergistic ones. High-quality …rms are more likely to sell synergistic assets if their …nancing needs are low, whereas low-quality …rms are more likely to do so if their …nancing needs are high.
Conclusion
This paper has studied a …rm's choice between …nancing through asset sales and equity issuance. One relevant consideration is the relative information asymmetry of non-core assets and equity, a natural extension of the MM insight. This paper introduces three additional e¤ects that drive a …rm's …nancing decision. First, investors in an equity issue share in the cash raised, but purchasers of non-core assets do not. Since the value of cash is certain, this mitigates the information asymmetry of equity: the certainty e¤ect. Thus, low (high) …nancing needs are met through asset (equity) sales. This result is robust to allowing the cash to be used to …nance an uncertain investment.
Second, the choice of …nancing may also depend on operational motives (synergies). A higher …nancing need pushes high-quality …rms towards equity, due to the certainty e¤ect, and reduces the quality and price of assets sold. The synergy motive also allows …rms to disguise an asset sale, that is in reality motivated by the asset's low quality, as instead being motivated by operational reasons (dissynergies): the camou ‡age e¤ect.
Third, a disadvantage of equity issuance is that the market attaches a low valuation not only to the equity being sold, but also to the remainder of the …rm, since both are perfectly correlated. This need not be the case for an asset sale, since the asset being sold need not be a carbon copy of the …rm. This correlation e¤ect can lead to asset sales being strictly preferred to equity.
The paper suggests a number of avenues for future research. On the empirical side, it gives rise to a number of new predictions, particularly relating to the amount of …nancing required and the purpose for which funds are raised. On the theoretical side, a number of extensions are possible. One would be to allow for other sources of asset-level capital raising, such as equity carve-outs. Since issuing asset-level debt or equity does not involve a loss of (dis)synergies, a carve-out is equivalent to asset sales in our model if synergies are zero, but it would be interesting to analyze the case in which synergies are non-zero and the …rm has a choice between asset sales, carve-outs, and equity issuance. Another restriction is that, in Section 4.2, where …rms can choose whether to raise capital, they raise a …xed amount F (as in MM), since there is a single investment opportunity with a known investment requirement of F . An additional extension would be to allow for multiple investment opportunities of di¤erent scale, in which case a continuum of amounts will be raised in equilibrium.
